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Abstract 
This novel empirical study contributes to the literature on the foreign exchange market and 
financial liberalisation. We examine the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) in a 
panel of forty countries, using a statistical approach to measure market pressure, with particular 
focus upon the impact of capital controls. We also consider whether EMP is related to a range of 
other macroeconomic indicators, policy variables and trade openness. We find that capital 
controls are associated with weaker currencies, especially for advanced countries. Our results are 
robust to potential endogeneity and different measures of exchange market pressure. 
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1. Introduction 
 A long standing academic literature has recommended using capital controls to deal with 
the challenges of financial globalisation, see inter alia Tobin (1978), Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(1993), Krugman (1998) and Stiglitz (1999). With the global financial crisis and a recent surge in 
capital inflows to emerging markets, capital controls are back on the academic and policy 
agenda, see Baba and Kokenyne (2011), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012a,b), De Paoli and 
Lipinska (2013), and Eichengreen and Rose (2014a,b). The former Brazilian Finance Minister 
Guido Mantega was, for example, a vociferous critic of other countries’ competitive 
devaluations. He went so far as to label them “international currency wars” and responded with a 
series of controls to avoid the impact upon the Brazilian Real.
3
 Brazil is not alone in recently re-
introducing controls. Cyprus and Iceland have also implemented different forms of capital 
controls, see Eichengreen and Rose (2014b). Overall IMF member countries have increased their 
use of capital controls from 164 measures by July 2012 to 202 measures by August 2013, see 
IMF (2012, 2013).
4
  
Given this context, it is relevant to ask the following questions. What is the impact of 
capital controls upon the exchange rate? Shall the impact be different across advanced and 
emerging market economies? And do capital controls matter more or less during crisis periods in 
the FX market? In principle, controls may be associated with weaker or stronger currencies. 
Some believe capital controls may counter capital inflows that appreciate the domestic currency, 
and also fuel a consumption boom and asset price bubbles, see Chamon and Garcia, (2013). In 
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 See Financial Times (2010), Stiglitz (2012), Ostry et al. (2012), Chamon and Garcia (2013) and Table A in the 
appendix for more details on Brazil’s recent experience with capital controls. 
4
 Capital controls have always been permissible by the IMF (Gallagher, 2011), but it was surprising that the IMF 
recently expressed the institutional view that “in certain circumstances, capital flow management measures can be 
useful,” IMF (2012a). 
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contrast the currency crisis literature has widely documented a link between capital account 
liberalization and domestic currency stability.
5
 The existing empirical literature rejects the 
hypothesis that capital controls insulate an economy from external shocks. This evidence 
requires reinvestigation, given the recent revival of capital controls and the earlier literature’s 
limitation that it models FX market pressure using a simple dummy variable approach, see 
Edwards (2006); Glick et al. (2006); and Glick and Hutchison (2011).   
This paper’s main objective consequently is to empirically model the main determinants 
of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP), using measures from Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Girton 
and Roper (1977). Exchange Market Pressure is the sum of changes in the exchange rate, foreign 
reserves and/or interest rates. We seek to add to evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls 
in insulating an economy from destabilising capital inflows. We are unaware of any other studies 
that evaluate the effects of capital account liberalization on a continuous measure of exchange 
market pressure, with a large panel dataset of advanced and emerging market economies. Our 
continuous measure of EMP conveys more information than a simple discrete speculative attack 
dummy; see Mandilaras and Bird (2008). This paper models capital controls using the Chinn and 
Ito (2008) Index of capital account openness. Furthermore, a number of control variables are 
used to evaluate the effects of trade openness, policy regimes and macroeconomic fundamentals. 
This paper endeavours to account for the potential endogeneity of capital controls and EMP by 
using Instrumental Variables. Our large panel dataset helpfully allows us to consider whether 
capital controls have a different impact across advanced economies and emerging markets. 
Finally, we examine whether crisis periods are especially related to capital control measures by 
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 More generally see Edison et al. (2002) for a survey of literature on capital account liberalization and economic 
performance. 
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using Probit analysis for our sample of forty countries. Hence, we contribute to the literature on 
the FX market and the impact of country characteristics. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, we set out our methodology: our continuous 
measure of Exchange Market Pressure and the empirical methods used in the paper. In the third 
section we discuss our panel dataset and present our Instrumental Variable and Probit empirical 
results. The last section concludes and offers some policy prescriptions. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Exchange Market Pressure Index 
 We begin with a discussion of issues related to our key variable of interest. Our preferred 
measure of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) consists of a weighted average of the exchange 
rate, relative interest rates and foreign exchange reserves. It is sometimes argued that the 
components of an exchange market pressure index depend on the structure of the economy and 
therefore, must be derived from a structural macroeconomic model of exchange rate 
determination. However, structural exchange rate models that link the exchange rate to 
macroeconomic variables have found it challenging to forecast better than a random walk, see 
Meese and Rogoff (1983). Due to the controversial nature of exchange rate models, we adopt 
Eichengreen’s et al. (1996) statistical approach to construct an Exchange Market Pressure Index 
for a panel of forty countries as follows: 
))](())(()[( ** ititiititiitiit ffiisEMP             (1) 
This exchange market pressure index EMPit for country i at time t is therefore a weighted sum of 
spot exchange rate changes (Δsit), relative interest rate change )(
*
itit ii   and relative foreign 
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exchange reserve changes )( *itit ff  . Lower case variables have been transformed into 
logarithmic form and the Greek letter denotes the first difference operator. The spot exchange 
rate ( its ) is defined as the log price of the US$ in domestic currency units. Hence, a rise in its  is 
a domestic currency depreciation. An asterisks (*) denotes the foreign counterpart of domestic 
variables.  
Modelling exchange market pressure using only exchange rate changes is not enough as 
monetary authorities may alleviate upward pressure for example by raising interest rate and/or 
spending foreign exchange reserves. Therefore, interest rate and foreign exchange reserve 
changes constitute valid components of an exchange market pressure index. An increase in the 
exchange rate, a rise in interest rate and a loss of foreign exchange reserves imply an increase in 
exchange market pressure. The parameters i , i  and i in equation (1) are weights assigned to 
components of the exchange market pressure index and are based on the inverse of their 
volatilities. This assigns a low weight to more volatile components and thus ensures equal 
importance of all components. This approach also has the advantage that it is not conditional 
upon implicit macroeconomic assumptions, for example those made by Girton and Roper (1977) 
and Weymark (1995). Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis we assess the robustness of our 
results by also using a measure of exchange market pressure from Girton and Roper (1977). 
Girton and Roper (1977), hereafter GR, first used a monetary model of exchange rate 
determination and derived an exchange market pressure index which is a simple sum of 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes. It assigns equal weights to both exchange 
rate and foreign exchange reserve changes; it does not require the estimation of any model 
parameters to derive the weights of the index. Roper and Turnovsky (1980) on the other hand, 
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used a macroeconomic model to derive the trade-off that monetary authorities face between 
targeting domestic credit and the exchange rate when stabilizing domestic output. The derived 
exchange market pressure index is the sum of exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves 
changes. However, both index components are not equally important, requiring the estimation of 
six parameters to construct these weights. Weymark (1995) also construct an exchange market 
pressure index based upon a macro-model and requires the estimation of two parameters to 
assign weights to the foreign exchange reserve component of the exchange market pressure 
index. In contrast to these studies, Pentecost et al. (2001) used a wealth augmented monetary 
model and derived an exchange market pressure index which is a simple sum of the exchange 
rate, foreign exchange reserve and relative interest differential changes. Only one parameter has 
to be estimated in the construction of Pentecost’s et al. (2001) exchange market pressure index. 
Our empirical work focuses upon the Eichengreen et al. (1996) statistical measure of market 
pressure, as it accounts for interest rate changes and standardises each component of the index.  
 The empirical market pressure literature has mainly focused on macroeconomic variables 
as EMP determinants. Girton and Roper (1977) first examined the determinants of exchange 
market pressure for Canada. The estimated equation used domestic and foreign monetary 
aggregates, and domestic and foreign income as exchange market pressure explicators. Connolly 
and da Silveira (1979) applied the GR model of exchange market pressure to the postwar 
Brazilian monetary experience. Their single equation approach used domestic credit, foreign 
prices and domestic income as exchange market pressure determinants. A dynamic GR model 
was applied to Canada by Burdekin and Burkett (1990) and they used the US and Canadian GDP 
deflator, and Treasury Bill Rate as EMP determinants. Kim (1985), Thornton (1995) and 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999) slightly modified the Connolly and da Silveira (1979) 
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version of GR and used the money multiplier as an additional independent variable. Wohar and 
Lee (1992) extended GR and included foreign real income, foreign money supply and foreign 
interest rate as regressors. Pollard (1999) used Wohar and Lee’s (1992) specification and 
evaluated the effects of net central bank credit as a percentage of high powered money, the 
money multiplier, foreign money supply, deviations from purchasing power parity, domestic and 
foreign real income, and the interest rate differential on market pressure. These studies indicate 
that domestic credit, foreign price, domestic real income, the US Treasury Bill Rate, money 
multiplier and deviations from purchasing power parity are the main determinants of exchange 
market pressure. We account for this literature in our results section. 
The studies discussed above have evaluated individual country exchange market pressure 
determinants using time series data. However, Bird and Mandilaras (2006) and Mandilaras and 
Bird (2008) are multi-country studies and evaluate the determinants of exchange market pressure 
using a panel approach. The former study focused on the effects of fiscal imbalance on exchange 
market pressure for East Asian and Pacific and Latin American countries. The latter study 
examined the relationship between market pressure and the foreign debt burden for Latin 
American countries. Furthermore, they use monetary aggregates, unemployment and measures of 
banking system health as control variables. The empirical evidence obtained from these studies 
show that the budget balance as percent of GDP, fixed and intermediate exchange rate regime, 
Federal Funds Rate, short term debt, domestic credit and total debt are important exchange 
market pressure determinants in a panel framework. Following Bird and Mandilaras (2006) and 
Mandilaras and Bird (2008) we also advocate multi-country panel methods in this context. Next 
we set out the empirical methods utilized in this paper, which focuses on the relationship 
between exchange market pressure and capital controls. 
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2.2 Econometric Methods   
 We adopt as our benchmark empirical model the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
approach for evaluating the determinants of exchange market pressure in our panel of advanced 
and emerging market economies. Our benchmark panel model suggests EMPit, for country i at 
time t, is a linear function of country intercepts, ci, and a vector of independent variables, xit: 
,ititiit uxcEMP    ),0(~
2
uit IIDu             (2) 
Where   is a vector of parameters. The error term ( itu ) has zero mean and constant variance. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that all xit are independent of all uit, that is 0][ itituxE . Our 
benchmark panel model takes account of country heterogeneity by allowing the intercept to vary 
across countries, hence taking account of differences in the structure of each economy under 
consideration. After introducing a dummy variable for each country to denote time invariant 
heterogeneity in their economies, we write equation (2) as:   
ititij
N
j
jit uxdcEMP 

'
1
             (3) 
However, the introduction of too many regressors in equation (3) renders this regression model 
unattractive. In order to avoid this problem, we estimate the regression model in deviation from 
individual means which enables us to eliminate individual effects, ic . The regression model in 
deviation form is as follows: 
iiii uxcEMP  
'
              (4) 
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Where iEMP  is a mean of the dependent variable and is defined as 


T
t
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1
1 ; ix  
and iu  are defined in a similar way. Therefore, having subtracted equation (4) from equation (2), 
we obtain equation (5) as follows: 
)()( iitiitiit uuxxEMPEMP              (5) 
Equation (5) is a regression model in deviation from individual means and does not contain 
individual country effects ci. The ordinary least square estimate of   obtained from this 
transformed model is the fixed effect estimator and is given as: 
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          (6) 
The use of a fixed effects approach with first differenced data overcomes any potential 
nonstationarity issues. However, some of the variables used in the estimated exchange market 
pressure equation may be simultaneously determined. It is possible that pressure on the exchange 
rate may lead to the imposition of capital controls. Some of the explicators below, for example 
remittances, the reserve import ratio and real exchange rate, share terms with the dependent 
variable. Moreover, trade openness could be endogenous through the feedback between trade and 
financial openness. Aizenman (2003) illustrates that greater trade openness increases the 
effective cost of enforcing financial repression. Financial openness is thus a by-product of 
greater trade integration. There could also be reverse causality, because greater financial 
openness may reduce the cost of trade credit and encourage foreign direct investment, and both 
may provide incentives to more commercial trade. This result in a simultaneity problem for 
capital controls. In such a situation, Ordinary Least Squares suffers from bias which can be 
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avoided using instruments for endogenous variables in the regression.
6
 The instruments used 
must be (a) uncorrelated with the error term, (b) correlated with the endogenous variable, and (c) 
must not be an explanatory variable in the original regression (Murray, 2006). Two Stage Least 
Squares is an example of Instrumental Variable estimation. It requires an equal number of 
instruments and endogenous variables.
7
 It is commonly observed that the instrument used for an 
endogenous variable is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable in question. Using such a 
variable as an instrument is likely to produce larger standard errors and hence insignificant 
estimators (Verbeek, 2008).
8
  
The final estimator used in this paper is the Probit Limited Dependent Variable approach. 
We follow Eichengreen et al. (1996) and construct a crisis index using the following criterion: 
1itCrisis if EMPit > 1.5σEMP + μEMP; and 0itCrisis otherwise, where σEMP and μEMP are the 
unconditional standard deviation and mean of EMPit. We now go on to discuss the data in the 
paper and present our results. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Ordinary least square estimation is biased due to correlation between error term and one of the explanators in the 
regression equation. Such a correlation may result from an endogenous variable, a mismeasured explanator, an 
omitted explanator or lagged dependent variable among the explanators (Murray, 2006). 
7
 The equation is exactly identified when the number of instruments equals the number of endogenous explanators. 
The equation is overidentified if the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables.   
8
 Two other problems associated with the use of weak instruments are (a) Use of an instrument despite weak 
correlation between endogenous variables and instrument can lead to inconsistency in instrumental variable 
estimates, and (b) OLS and IV estimates bias in the same direction in finite sample. As the R
2 
between instrument 
and endogenous variable approaches zero, the magnitude of the IV bias approaches that of OLS (Bound et al. 1995).  
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3. Results 
3.1. Data 
 This study uses annual data from 1977 to 2012 in a panel of up to forty advanced and 
emerging market economies.  See Table 1 for the list of countries used in this study. To construct 
our Eichengreen et al. (1996) exchange market pressure index the main source of data are the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics. Capital controls are proxied by the Chinn and Ito (2008) 
capital account openness index. Chinn and Ito (2008) construct an openness index using data on 
capital account restrictions reported in the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Chinn and Ito (2008) construct their index 
through two steps. Firstly, they assign a dummy variable for four major categories on external 
accounts such as the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on capital account 
transactions, restrictions on current account transactions and requirements to surrender export 
proceeds. Secondly, they construct the index of capital account openness through a standardised 
principal component. An increase in the index implies increasing capital account openness. 
Hence, the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account openness index is a continuous variable and has 
the advantage that it attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls.  
Figure 1. Exchange Market Pressure and Capital Controls 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Notes: this graph presents Exchange Market Pressure data from Eichengreen et al. (1996) (grey line) and 
Capital Controls (black line). Data is for Australia, Argentina, Brazil and Spain between 1977 and 2012. A 
rise in EMP is a rise in FX market pressure (left hand scale). A rise in the capital account openness index is 
a fall in capital controls (right hand scale). Correlations between EMP and controls for these countries are 
negative, and range from -0.04 for Spain and -0.36 for Brazil. Australia and Argentina correlations are        
-0.10 and -0.30 respectively. 
Figure 1 presents some indicative graphical evidence to illustrate the relationship 
between exchange market pressure and capital controls. The figure highlights that capital 
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account liberalisation has been pursued in the advanced and emerging market economies but 
there have been reversals in Australia, Argentina and Brazil. Brazil has recently reintroduced 
capital controls due to capital inflows and a strong Brazilian Real. Brazilian exchange market 
pressure has subsequently become negative. Overall for these four countries there has been a 
negative unconditional correlation between EMP and capital controls for our sample period. 
Eichengreen and Rose (2014a) suggest capital controls are persistent, with little evidence of 
substantial and frequent changes in controls. Given the high volatility of EMP compared to 
capital controls, this highlights the need for panel estimation to exploit time series and cross 
sectional variation across countries, and also to consider additional explicators of EMP. 
The data on monetary aggregates is taken from World Bank WDI for all countries except 
Austria, Canada, Germany, Greece and Spain, which is taken from IMF IFS and OECD 
statistics. Trade openness data is taken from WDI. Since the number of time series observations 
used in this study differs to some extent from country to country, our panel data set is 
unbalanced. See Table B in the Appendix for further details on the data sources used in this 
paper. 
3.2. Empirical Results 
 This paper uses fixed effects and instrumental variable (i.e. two stage least squares) 
estimation methods that includes cross section effects for evaluating the determinants of 
exchange market pressure in a panel of up to forty countries. We then go on to consider Probit 
estimation using random effects. Our main focus is on the relationship between capital controls   
( itK ) and exchange market pressure (EMPit), but we also consider the exchange rate regime, 
inflation targeting, trade openness, and other key macroeconomic variables. The most general 
specification we use in this paper is given as: 
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ititititititit
ititititiit
uyremmrITIntermed
FixedqOKEMP


1098765
4321


                         (7) 
0,, 983  , 0,,, 7654    
The sign and significance of the coefficient 1  on capital account openness ( itK ) is uncertain a 
priori and central to our analysis. The additional determinants of EMP that we consider in 
equation (7) are: current account openness ( itO ); the change in the real exchange rate ( itq ); the 
inflation targeting regime ( itIT );
9
 change in the reserve import ratio ( itr ); change in monetary 
aggregates ( itm ); change in remittances ( itrem ); and growth in real income ( ity ). The 
Ilzetzki et al. (2008) coarse index of de facto exchange rate regimes is used to construct Fixedit 
and Intermedit, which are dummy variables for fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes 
respectively. For a fixed regime, a value of 1 is assigned to no separate legal tender, pre-
announced peg or currency board arrangement, pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower 
than or equal to %2  and de facto pegs. An Intermedit dummy is constructed by assigning a 
value of 1 to a de facto crawling peg, pre-announced crawling peg, a de facto crawling band that 
is wider than or equal to %5 , a moving band that is wider than or equal to %2  and managed 
float. See Appendix Table C for further details. 
Trade openness has also remained a contentious issue in the empirical literature on EMP. 
The opponents of trade openness argue that a weakening of a country’s export sector reduces the 
inflow of foreign capital and increases susceptibility to market pressure. Frankel and Cavallo 
(2008) argued that trade and capital account openness go hand-in-hand, which reduces a 
country’s ability to effectively implement capital controls. Rose (2005) explains that strong trade 
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 We follow Petursson (2004) when constructing our inflation targeting dummy variable. 
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links reduce a country’s default probabilities and hence reduces pressure on the domestic 
currency to depreciate. Hence, our study also considers the impact of trade openness on exchange 
market pressure. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 presents our first set of results on the determinants of exchange market pressure. 
Column [1] uses fixed effects estimation to take account of unobserved heterogeneity, as set out 
in equation (6), and the Eichengreen et al. measure of market pressure (EMP1) for both advanced 
and emerging market countries. There is little evidence capital or current account openness 
matter for exchange rate pressure in column [1]. In contrast, money is important with fixed 
effects estimation: an increase in the money supply is associated with an increase in exchange 
market pressure, consistent with the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. The real 
exchange rate has a significant and positive link with EMP1. While income, reserves, fixed 
regimes and remittance have a negative association. However, fixed effects estimation does not 
account for potential endogeneity. In response to strong exchange market pressure to appreciate 
for example, a government may introduce capital controls. Hence, we subsequently focus upon a 
2SLS Instrumental Variable (IV) with fixed effects estimator in the rest of our analysis.  
Table 2 column [2] provides our first IV estimates. While capital controls remain 
insignificant with IV, the coefficient and t-statistic have increased. Indeed, once we take a 
General-to-Specific approach and delete insignificant variables in column [3], we find that 
exchange market pressure is significantly related to capital controls at the 10% level. We also 
consider whether this result is robust to the Girton-Roper market press measure (i.e. EMP2). For 
this large panel of countries we find evidence that capital controls are strongly related to market 
 15 
 
pressure. In addition, column [5] implies trade openness is related to EMP2. This first set of 
results suggests that capital controls and trade openness may be important for market pressure. 
We take account of unobserved fixed effects in Table 2, but there may be differences in 
responses to capital controls across our broad panel of countries. Hence we next split our panel 
into advanced and emerging market countries, especially given we have a large number of 
countries and income may matter for the determinants of EMP.
10
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 indicates that capital account openness matters for exchange market pressure in 
advanced economies, when using IV and irrespective of the measure of exchange market 
pressure. An increase in capital account openness is linked to a reduction in both measures of 
market pressure. There are two channels through which capital account openness may reduce 
exchange market pressure. First, market liquidity increases with an increase in international 
capital flows. An increase in market liquidity in turn accelerates economic growth primarily by 
boosting productivity growth. Second, the efficiency of the domestic financial sector improves 
due to the presence of foreign banks, which in turn spurs economic growth (Levine, 2001). Better 
macroeconomic fundamentals reduce market pressure, a finding consistent with first generation 
currency crisis models, see Krugman (1979). This is a key result in our paper. In addition, 
movements in the real exchange rate also are linked to EMP. An increase in the real exchange 
rate is associated with an increase in both Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Girton and Roper (1976) 
measures. Trade openness is relevant with a small coefficient for Girton and Roper (1976) EMP 
                                                          
10
 As recommended by the Referee, we also experiment with other measures of financial openness (i.e. capital 
controls). We considered Quinn and Toyoda (2008) and Dreher (2006, 2015) capital openness measures, since these 
had reasonable time spans covering our dataset. Therefore, we replicated the results in Table 2 and these also 
identified a strong link between financial openness and exchange market pressure. See Quinn et al. (2011) for an 
extensive discussion of different measure of capital account openness. 
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in column [3] and [4] of Table 3. The reserve import ratio and real income are significant but 
they have the opposite sign with the two measures of market pressure. Money is unimportant for 
EMP in advanced economies, possibly since monetary policy has been more prudent for much of 
our data period and less likely to induce currency difficulties. 
Next we consider whether capital controls are equally important for emerging market 
economies using IV estimation. Table 4 presents mixed evidence on the impact of capital 
controls on EMP for these countries. There is some evidence of the relevance of capital account 
openness using the Girton and Roper measure. However, this is only borderline significant at the 
5% significance level. EMP2 is also a less complete measure since it does not account for interest 
rate changes and the components of the market pressure index are equally weighted, unlike our 
preferred measure from Eichengreen et al. (1996). Table 4 indicates that growth in money 
aggregates is connected to increasing EMP, consistent with expectations that loose monetary 
policy weakens the currency. This contrasts with the insignificance of money growth for 
advanced economies’ EMP, affirming their improved monetary conduct. Focusing upon our 
preferred measure EMP1 in columns [1] and [2] of Table 4, nominal anchors of a fixed exchange 
rate regime and inflation targeting, and increased levels of reserves are associated with a decline 
in exchange market pressure in emerging markets.   
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, we present results from Probit estimation to examine crisis situations in the FX 
market.
11
 Eichengreen and Rose (2014a,b) mention that although they are rare, financial crisis 
can cause countries to introduce capital controls, for example Iceland in 2008 and Cyprus in 
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 Due to space constraints, we focus upon our preferred Eichengreen et al. (1993) measure of EMP in the Probit 
analysis. 
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2013. We use a limited dependent variable to indicate when there are extreme movements in 
EMP, since these are potentially situations a government would wish to influence by using 
capital controls. Table 5 column [2] shows that while exchange market pressure in extreme 
circumstances is negatively associated with liberalization in advanced economies, this is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The level of reserves, real exchange rate and growth rate 
are most important in a crisis for EMP. Also, emerging market economies capital controls have 
little statistical connection to EMP. Monetary policy, by way of money growth and reserves, are 
more important for EMP in a crisis for emerging markets. Hence, we extend the Probit results of 
Glick and Hutchinson (2011) to both emerging markets and advanced economies, implying that 
capital controls have little impact in extreme market situations. This suggests that underlying 
fundamentals are more important for ‘extreme’ currency movements, possibly because capital 
controls are more slowly moving than currency crises, see Eichengreen and Rose (2014a). 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
To summarize our results overall, the negative relationship between market pressure and 
capital account openness, evidenced in Tables 2, 3 and 4, indicate that an increase in financial 
openness is linked to a reduction in pressure on EMP, especially for advanced countries. Hence, 
more open advanced economies, with respect to the capital account, are less likely to experience 
negative speculative attacks in normal times. It appears beneficial for advanced countries to 
liberalize their financial sector. For emerging markets, capital account openness seems only to be 
relevant for the Girton and Roper measure. As the Girton and Roper measure does not cover 
interest rates and weighs the components of EMP equally, there is some doubt cast on this 
finding. Other significant determinants relevant for EMP include the real money supply, fixed 
and intermediate exchange rate regimes, the reserve import ratio and real exchange rate. 
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Furthermore, strong growth in real income implies strong currencies, a finding consistent with 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and first generation currency crisis models that emphasize the 
importance of sound macroeconomic fundamentals for avoiding speculative attacks. Therefore, 
countries also have to be cognizant of developments in domestic real income, if they are 
concerned with avoiding pressure on their currencies. The results for advanced economies 
confirm earlier empirical evidence that documents a negative relationship between liberalized 
capital account and the likelihood of currency crisis. In general the estimated coefficients for 
additional explicators are plausible. 
4. Conclusion 
 An earlier empirical literature provided mixed evidence of the effectiveness of capital 
controls. This paper utilized the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account index to measure capital 
account openness and to consider the consequences of financial openness for the foreign 
exchange market.  Furthermore, we also used continuous measures of exchange market pressure 
from Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Girton and Roper (1977). The results indicate that capital 
account openness is an important correlate with our two measures of market pressure for 
advanced economies. For emerging market economies, capital account openness appears to be 
relevant for the Girton and Roper measure. Differences in the effects of capital account openness 
for advanced and emerging market economies may be due to the depth and development of the 
financial sector, strong checks and balances and the quality of regulatory institutions in advanced 
countries (Eichengreen and Rose, 2014a). Our results were robust to different measures of capital 
controls. Other relevant determinants of EMP are the real money supply, real exchange rate, 
fixed and intermediate exchange rate regime, reserve import ratio and real income. Probit results 
were less supportive of capital controls than IV. Capital controls appear to be less relevant in 
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times of acute market stress, which may partly be due to their slow moving nature, see 
Eichengreen and Rose (2014a). Hence it is important for countries to formulate growth oriented 
policies and be cognizant of developments in other relevant macroeconomic determinants like 
money, reserves and the real exchange rate to avoid speculative attacks on their currencies.   
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Table 1. List of Countries 
Advanced Economies 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,  
Netherland, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
 
Emerging Markets 
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippine, Qatar, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey.  
Notes: There are 40 countries in the unbalanced panel dataset between 1977 and 2012. Division of countries into 
advanced economies and emerging market countries is from IMF World Economic Outlook 
[https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/groups.htm]. 
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Table 2. Exchange Market Pressure and Capital Controls  
Dependent EMP1 EMP1 EMP1 EMP2 EMP2 
Estimator 
Explicator 
FE 
[1] 
IV 
[2] 
IV 
[3] 
IV 
[4] 
IV 
[5] 
itK  -0.012 -0.065 -0.123* -0.052** -0.032** 
(-0.157) (-0.675) (-1.822) (-3.068) (-2.991) 
itO  
-0.01 -0.011  0.004** 0.003** 
(-1.134) (-1.184)  (2.522) (3.105) 
itFixed  
-0.429** -0.415*  -0.032  
(-1.984) (-1.876)  (-0.815)  
itIT  
-0.237 -0.221  0.007  
(-1.498) (-1.318)  (0.245)  
itIntermed  -0.098 -0.103  -0.055*  
(-0.615) (-0.630)  (-1.936)  
itm  0.781** 0.760** 0.892** 0.318** 0.343** 
(2.320) (2.238) (2.737) (5.333) (6.612) 
itq  4.670** 4.766** 5.594** 0.295** 0.334** 
(9.214) (9.119) (11.289) (3.224) (4.203) 
itr  -4.443** -4.350** -3.967** 0.839** 0.846** 
(-13.378) (-12.907) (-13.504) (14.199) (17.916) 
itrem  -0.441* -0.403  -0.01  
(-1.701) (-1.537)  (-0.222)  
ity  -2.395** -2.354** -1.491** -0.047  
(-2.278) (-2.227) (-2.012) (-0.253)  
Constant 0.474** 0.510** 0.266** -0.534** -0.461** 
(2.828) (2.974) (3.953) (-17.747) (-44.119) 
      
NT 1119 1091 1358 1091 1343 
N 39 39 40 39 40 
2R  0.207 0.205 0.196 0.220 0.255 
F-statistic 27.991** 26.910** 63.749** 29.936** 89.474** 
F p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: This table investigates the impact of capital controls upon Exchange Market Pressure measures from 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) (EMP1) and Girton and Roper (1977) (EMP2). The sample period is 1977 to 2012, for up 
to 40 Advanced and Emerging Market Economies in an unbalanced panel. Estimation of equation (7) is by panel 
fixed effects (FE) in column [1] and panel instrumental variables (IV) with fixed effects (i.e. 2SLS) in columns 
[2]-[5]. For IV endogenous variables are instrumented by lagged values. Estimation is based upon equation (7). See 
Table B in the Appendix for a list of explicators. T-statistics are in parentheses (.). Asterisks (**) and (*) indicate 
that estimated parameters are significant at five and ten percent significance level respectively. NT is the number of 
observations. N is the number of countries. We present within R
2
. F-statistic tests the joint null of insignificant 
estimated parameters. F-statistic p-values in square brackets [.]. 
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Table 3. EMP and Capital Controls: Advanced Economies IV Estimation 
Dependent EMP1 EMP1 EMP2 EMP2 
Estimator 
Explicator 
IV 
[1] 
IV 
[2] 
IV 
[3] 
IV 
[4] 
itK  -0.210** -0.212** -0.011** -0.012** 
(-1.964) (-3.150) (-3.107) (-5.043) 
itO  
-0.016  0.003** 0.003** 
(-1.165)  (7.148) (7.170) 
itFixed  
0.237  -0.001  
(1.024)  (-0.132)  
itIT  
-0.09  -0.005  
(-0.531)  (-0.883)  
itIntermed  0.089  -0.002  
(0.497)  (-0.264)  
itm  0.290  -0.004  
(0.847)  (-0.395)  
itq  19.117** 19.408** 0.436** 0.440** 
(15.570) (17.610) (11.012) (11.216) 
itr  -6.886** -6.873** 0.939** 0.939** 
(-14.314) (-15.869) (60.571) (61.335) 
itrem  0.594  0.059** 0.059** 
(1.310)  (4.030) (4.054) 
ity  -31.298** -35.556** 1.512** 1.530** 
(-5.149) (-6.875) (7.716) (8.011) 
Constant 0.684** 0.859** 0.032** 0.031** 
(2.686) (5.998) (3.923) (6.128) 
     
NT 550 645 550 550 
N 18 19 18 18 
2R  0.478 0.491 0.893 0.892 
F-statistic 47.642** 148.881** 433.94** 726.784** 
F p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: This table investigates the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure measures from 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) (EMP1) and Girton and Roper (1977) (EMP2). Sample 1977 to 2012 for 
up to 19 advanced economies in this unbalanced panel. Estimation is by panel instrumental 
variables with fixed effects. Endogenous variables are instrumented. T-statistics are in parentheses 
(.).Asterisks (**) and (*) indicate that estimated parameters are significant at five and ten percent 
significance level respectively. NT is the number of observations. N is the number of countries. We 
present within R
2
. The F-statistic tests the joint null of insignificant estimated parameters. F 
statistics p-values in square brackets [.]. 
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Table 4. EMP and Capital Controls: Emerging Markets IV Estimation 
Dependent EMP1 EMP1 EMP2 EMP2 
Estimator 
Explicator 
IV 
[1] 
IV 
[2] 
IV 
[3] 
IV 
[4] 
itK  0.029 0.005 -0.073* -0.048** 
 (0.179) (0.042) (-1.881) (-1.964) 
itO  
-0.023**  0.004* 0.005** 
(-2.065)  (1.660) (2.520) 
itFixed  -1.115** -0.901** 0.022  
(-2.911) (-3.631) (0.244)  
itIT  -0.696** -0.577** 0.035  
(-2.217) (-2.376) (0.474)  
itIntermed  
-0.216  0.009  
(-0.744)  (0.133)  
itm  2.105** 2.285** 0.839** 0.853** 
(3.422) (4.164) (5.752) (7.698) 
itq  2.481** 3.136** 0.181  
(4.275) (5.755) (1.313)  
itr  -3.476** -3.025** 0.814** 0.829** 
(-8.123) (-8.447) (8.016) (10.918) 
itrem  -0.494  -0.035  
(-1.626)  (-0.489)  
ity  -1.901*  -0.064  
(-1.730)  (-0.247)  
Constant 0.798** 0.460** -1.336** -1.002** 
(2.359) (3.599) (-16.662) (-50.499) 
     
NT 541 702 541 701 
N 21 21 21 21 
2R  0.209 0.189 0.206 0.240 
F-statistic 13.428** 26.147** 13.595** 54.152** 
F p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: This table investigates the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure measures from 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) (EMP1) and Girton and Roper (1977) (EMP2). Sample 1977 to 2012 for up 
to 21 emerging markets in this unbalanced panel. Estimation is by panel instrumental variables with 
fixed effects. Endogenous variables are instrumented. T-statistics are in parentheses (.).Asterisks (**) 
and (*) indicate that estimated parameters are significant at five and ten percent significance level 
respectively.NT is the number of observations. N is the number of countries. We present within R
2
. The 
F-statistic tests the joint null of insignificant estimated parameters. F statistics p-values in square 
brackets [.]. 
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Table 5. Probit Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure  
Sample Full Advanced Emerging 
Estimator 
Explicator 
Probit 
[1] 
Probit 
[2] 
Probit 
[3] 
itK  0.026 -0.068 0.027 
(0.682) (-0.760) (0.473) 
itO     
   
itFixed  
   
   
itIT  
   
   
itIntermed  
0.218**   
(2.157)   
itm  0.561*  0.862** 
(1.784)  (2.272) 
itq  1.383** 10.121**  
(2.838) (4.349)  
itr  -2.352** -3.994 -2.081** 
(-6.127) (-4.508) (-4.917) 
itrem     
   
ity   -42.283**  
 (-4.410)  
Constant -1.815** -1.355** -1.627** 
(-15.281) (-6.287) (-18.198) 
    
NT 1385 665 740 
N 40 19 21 
LL -314.38 -124.832 -173.207 
Notes: Sample 1977 to 2012. This table investigates the determinants of Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) Crisis Index, using Probit random effects estimation. Values in parentheses (.) are 
t-statistics. Asterisks (**) and (*) indicate that estimated parameters are significant at five 
and ten percent significance levels respectively. NT is the number of observation. N is the 
number of countries in the panel. LL is log likelihood ratio statistic.    
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Appendix  
Table A Recent Brazilian Capital Controls 
 
Date Restriction Measure 
10/9/2009 Tighten Tighten Tax of 2 percent on portfolio equity and fixed income inflows 
11/8/2009 Tighten Tax of 1.5 percent on the issuance of depository receipts  into local equities 
10/4/2010 Tighten Tax rate raised to 4 percent for fixed income inflows 
10/18/2010 Tighten Tax rate was raised to 6 percent for fixed income inflows 
12/30/2010 Tighten Tax of 2 percent on the cancellation of depository receipts into local equities. 
1/6/2011 Tighten Unremunerated reserve requirement of 60 percent on bank's gross FX positions beyond 
US$3 billions 
3/28/2011 Tighten Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad with maturity below one year 
4/6/2011 Tighten Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad extended to maturity below two years 
7/8/2011 Tighten Unremunerated reserve requirement of 60 percent on bank's gross FX positions beyond 
US$1 billion 
7/26/2011 Tighten Tighten Tax on notional amount of currency derivatives 
12/1/2011 Loosen Tax on portfolio equity inflows eliminated 
2/29/2012 Tighten Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad extended to maturity below three years 
3/1/2012 Tighten Restricts anticipation of payments to exporters to one year horizon 
3/9/2012 Tighten Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad extended to maturity below five years 
3/152012 Loosen Tax on derivatives set to zero for hedging by exporters ( up to 1.2 times exports in previous 
year 
6/14/2012 Loosen Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad restricted to maturities below two years 
6/28/2012 Loosen Anticipation of payments to exporters can be done by financial institutions. 
12/4/2012 Loosen Anticipation of payments to exporters allowed for horizon above one year but below five 
years 
12/5/2012 Loosen Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad restricted to maturities below one year 
12/18/2012 Loosen Unremunerated reserve requirement on bank’s gross foreign exchange position only after 
US $ 3 billions 
6/4/2012 Loosen Tax on fixed income flows eliminated 
6/12/2012 Loosen Tax on notional amount of derivatives eliminated 
Notes: Data are from Chamon and Garcia (2013). All tightening restrictions were announced when the market was 
closed, and became effective on the following business day. The only exception was the January 6, 2011 
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on Banks’ Gross FX Positions which only became effective three months 
later. 
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Table B. List of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Source 
EMP1 Exchange Market Pressure Index from Eichengreen et al. (1996) [IFS] 
EMP2 Exchange Market Pressure Index from Girton and Roper (1977) [IFS] 
itK  Chinn and Ito (2008) Capital Account Openness Index 
itO  Trade Openness which is the change in exports plus imports as a % of GDP [WDI] 
itIT  Dummy variable capturing inflation targeting monetary policy regime 
itq  Real Exchange rate constructed by adjusting domestic and foreign price ratio with nominal 
Exchange rate [WDI] 
itr  Reserve import ratio [WDI] 
itm  Monetary aggregate (M2) [IFS] 
itrem  Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees paid [WDI] 
ity  Real GDP growth [WDI] 
Fixedit Dummy variables capturing fixed exchange rate regime, from Ilzezki et al. (2008) 
Intermedit Dummy variable capturing intermediate exchange rate regime, from Ilzezki et al. (2008) 
Notes: Data are from IMF International Financial Statistics [IFS] and World Bank World Development Indicators 
[WDI]. Δ denotes the first difference operator. The time dimension of this panel of annual data is 1977 to 2012. 
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Table C. De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regime 
Exchange Rate Regime Code 
No Separate Legal Tender 1 
Preannounced peg or currency board arrangement 1 
Preannounced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to   2% 1 
De facto peg 1 
Preannounced crawling peg 2 
Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   2% 2 
De facto crawling peg 2 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   2% 2 
Preannounced crawling band that is wider than   2% 2 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   5% 3 
Non crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   2% 3 
Managed floating 3 
Freely floating 4 
Freely falling (includes hyperfloat) 5 
Dual market in which parallel market data is missing 6 
Notes: the source of this data is Ilzezki et al. (2008). Exchange rate regimes are classified from 1 to 6  
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Figure 1. Exchange Market Pressure and Capital Controls 
 
 
 
Notes: this graph presents Exchange Market Pressure data from Eichengreen et al. (1996) (grey line) and 
Capital Controls (black line). Data is for Australia, Argentina, Brazil and Spain between 1977 and 2012. A 
rise in EMP is a rise in FX market pressure (left hand scale). A rise in the capital account openness index is 
a fall in capital controls (right hand scale). Correlations between EMP and controls for these countries are 
negative, and range from -0.04 for Spain and -0.36 for Brazil. Australia and Argentina correlations are        
-0.10 and -0.30 respectively. 
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